

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 NRC-05 EB-07

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /101 W
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P R 311645Z OCT 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1255

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0506

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION 3 EQUIPMENT ISSUES

REF: USNATO 5886 (DTG 291800Z OCT 75)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: REFTEL CONTAINS FRG RESPONSE TO US
PROPOSED COMPROMISE WORDING OF SPC PAPERS ON OPTION 3. THE
GERMANS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE GIVEN MUCH IN RESPONSE
TO WHAT WE CONSIDER A VERY FORTHCOMING US POSITION. THE FRG
HAS MODIFIED THE IDEA THAT WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED
IN ADVANCE TO TELL THE EAST IN THE FIRST EXPLORATORY PHASE IMMEDIATE
LY
AFTER WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER IS PRESENTED THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT BE P
RE-
PARED TO REDUCE NON-US ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS IN
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PHASE I. BUT THE FRG NOW WANTS THE WEST TO TELL THIS TO

THE EAST THROUGH A COUNCIL ACTION WHICH WOULD BE NEARLY AUTOMATICALLY TRIGGERED IF THE EAST "PRESSES" FOR REDUCTIONS OF NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS, EVEN DURING EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION PRIOR TO AN INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE. THE FRG ALSO CONTINUES TO WISH TO BRING UP WESTERN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT PHASE I LIMITATIONS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS DURING THE FIRST EXPLORATORY PHASE PRIOR TO EASTERN RESPONSE.

2. WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD TACKLE THE FRG AGAIN, AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN HOYNCK, AND PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE ORIGINAL US PROPOSAL. WE THINK IT ESSENTIAL, IF THE WEST IS TO GAIN ANY REAL BENEFIT OUT OF AN OPTION 3 PROPOSAL: (A) THAT ONLY AFTER REPEAT AFTER INITIAL CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE, WOULD THE WEST INFORM THE EAST THAT THE WEST WILL NOT ACCEPT LIMITS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS; (B) THAT THE WEST NOT REPEAT NOT EXPLICITLY INFORM THE EAST DURING PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE WEST IS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS OF OR LIMITATIONS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. END SUMMARY.

3. ON THE ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS POINT, THE FRG WISHES TO OBTAIN NATO AGREEMENT THAT, IF THE EAST "PRESSES FOR" REDUCTIONS OF NON-US ARMAMENTS, THE NAC WOULD IN EFFECT AUTHORIZE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO INFORM THE EAST THAT NON-US NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS PHASE I. THIS IS THE ONLY POINT IN PARA 3 OF THE POSITION PAPER WHICH IS NOT IN THE GUIDANCE ALREADY AND WHICH THE WEST WOULD NOT ALREADY HAVE PUT TO THE EAST. THE PRESENT FRG FORMULATION OF THIS POINT IS SUCH THAT EVEN EASTERN ENQUIRIES ABOUT NON-US NATO ARMS REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I COULD TRIGGER NATO GUIDANCE TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO TELL THE EAST, EVEN DURING EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION PRIOR TO AN INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE, THAT NOT ONLY WOULD THERE BE NO NON-US ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I, THERE WOULD ALSO BE NONE IN PHASE II.

4. THE FRG APPEARS TO IGNORE THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES WOULD ALREADY HAVE AGREED (PENDING PARAS 3 AND 5 OF GUIDANCE) THAT ALLIED REPS SHOULD INFORM THE EAST THAT NATO OPPOSES
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PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS AND THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD RESIST EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO SEEK COMMITMENTS TO SUCH WESTERN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II (PARA 3 OF GUIDANCE). THUS, THERE WOULD ALREADY BE A FULLY ADEQUATE ALLIED POSITION, BOTH AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND TACTICALLY WITH REGARD TO THE EAST, ON THE ISSUE OF REDUCTION OF NON-ALLIED ARMAMENTS IN EITHER PHASE I OR PHASE II.

5. THE GERMAN SUGGESTION IS THEREFORE UNNECESSARY FOR ANY ALLIED PURPOSES IN THE NEXT PERIOD. ON THE OTHER HAND, FLAT WESTERN STATEMENTS TO THE EAST THAT NON-US WESTERN ALLIES WILL NOT REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS WOULD HAVE THE SERIOUSLY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS BOTH PHASING AND THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL PROPER (MBFR VIENNA 0477 AND MBFR VIENNA 0484). MOREOVER, IF THE GERMANS SO INTERPRET PARA 10 OF THE GUIDANCE, IT COULD BE CONSIDERED TO REJECT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US NATO ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II AS WELL AS PHASE I. THIS WOULD HAVE EVEN MORE SERIOUS NEGOTIATING CONSEQUENCES. HENCE, WE WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL.

6. THERE MAY BE ONE OPEN ISSUE IN THIS CONTEXT WHOSE TREATMENT COULD GIVE THE FRG SOME SATISFACTION. AS IN THE EARLIER CASE OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS, THE GUIDANCE AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DEAL WITH POSSIBLE EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT NON-US NATO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. THIS GAP COULD BE FILLED BY ADDING A SENTENCE TO PARA 3 OF THE GUIDANCE IN THE VERSION WHICH THE US HAS NOT YET TABLED, AFTER THE PHRASE "TO SEEK COMMITMENTS TO SUCH WESTERN REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II." THE SENTENCE COULD BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES: BEGIN QUOTE: ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THE WEST IS NOT WILLING DURING PHASE I TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECT OF COMMITMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN

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ACTION ACDA-10

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P R 311645Z OCT 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1256

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
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USNMR SHAPE
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0506

FROM US REP MBFR

PHASE II. THIS DOES NOT AFFECT THE WEST'S WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT THAT ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. END QUOTE.

7. THIS POINT, PLUS THE CONTENT OF PARA 3B IS OF THE POSITION PAPER THAT THE NON-US ALLIES WILL NOT REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN EITHER PHASE, SHOULD PROVIDE FULLY ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO GERMAN INTERESTS ON THIS ISSUE. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE ALLIES WILL NEED MORE THAN THE POINT ABOVE FOR USE WITH THE EAST AS LONG AS THEY HOLD TO IT. WE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS THAT WESTERN FAILURE TO REPLY SPECIFICALLY TO EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF REDUCTION OF NON-US ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II WILL CREATE A JUSTIFIED IMPLICATION ON THE PART OF THE

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EAST THAT THE WEST IS PREPARED TO REDUCE NON-US ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. IF ANYTHING, THE EASTERN PRESUMPTION WOULD BE THAT, IF THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REDUCING NON-US WESTERN ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II, THEY PRESUMABLY WOULD INDICATE THIS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY AND MAKE MORE ACCEPTABLE ALLIED REFUSAL IN PHASE I TO REDUCE OR LIMIT NON-US ARMAMENTS. HENCE, IF ANYTHING, WESTERN SILENCE ON THIS POINT SHOULD CONVEY IMPLICATION OF ALLIED UNWILLINGNESS TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II. BUT THE POINT SHOULD NOT BE MADE EXPLICIT.

8. THE POINT FORMULATED IN PARA 6 ABOVE SHOULD ALSO COVER THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON NATO ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II WITHOUT CREATING A NEED TO RAISE THIS NEURALGIC POINT WITH THE ALLIES FOR SPECIFIC TREATMENT NOW OR LATER, WHEN THE EAST RAISES THE ISSUE SPECIFICALLY. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE GUIDANCE CONTAIN MATERIAL WHICH WILL PERMIT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

9. IF CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO OBTAIN FRG AGREEMENT, THE US MIGHT AGREE TO A SENTENCE TO BE PLACED IN THE POSITION PAPER AT THE END OF PARA 3 ALONG THE LINES THAT: BEGIN QUOTE: IF HEAVY EASTERN PRESSURE PERSISTS FOR WESTERN COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE NON-US ARMAMENTS IN EITHER PHASE I OR PHASE II, THE COUNCIL WILL CONSIDER WHETHER FURTHER GUIDANCE TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS BASED ON THIS PARAGRAPH IS NEEDED BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN PARAS 3 AND 5 OF THE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT. END QUOTE.

10. ON THE ARMAMENTS LIMITATION ISSUE, THE FRG DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTING THE US IDEA THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT DISCUSS EITHER WESTERN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS OF NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS UNTIL AFTER A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE AUGMENTED WESTERN PROPOSAL.

11. INSTEAD, PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 OF REFTEL MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE FRG IS POCKETING WHAT THE US
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PROPOSES FOR PARAGRAPH 5, WHILE MAINTAINING ITS ORIGINAL POSITION WITH REGARD TO INFORMING THE EAST ABOUT THE WESTERN POSITION AGAINST LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ARMAMENTS PRIOR TO A SITUATION WHICH MEETS THE CONDITIONS OF PARAGRAPH 6, A PRIOR CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION.

12. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THIS FRG POSITION AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE US COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. ITS USE COULD PUT THE ISSUE OF WEST EUROPEAN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ARMS LIMITATIONS AND THE WHOLE ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS IN THE FOREFRONT OF EAST-WEST DISCUSSION BEFORE THE EAST HAD RESPONDED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AUGMENTED WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL. THE US SHOULD PRESS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF ITS OWN PROPOSAL.

13. AS WE SEE IT, THE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES MAKES IT DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN BONN.

14. WE FEEL THE FRG IS ASKING FOR TOO MUCH. IT SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT IT HAS ALREADY GOTTEN A GREAT MANY OF ITS INTERESTS COVERED IN THE COURSE OF OPTION 3 CONSULTATION. THE US HAS ACCEPTED AN INCREASING PRIMACY FOR THE COMMON CEILING AND HAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE (A) NO LIMITATIONS ON NON-US WESTERN ARMAMENTS IN PHASE I AND (B) NO NON-US ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS EVEN IN PHASE II. BUT, NOT ONLY HAS THE FRG GOTTEN US AGREEMENT TO THESE LAST TWO POINTS, IT STILL APPARENTLY WANTS TO

ASK THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE POINT ON LIMITATIONS FROM THE
OUTSET AS PART OF THE BASIS FOR THE INITIAL EASTERN RE-
SPONSE TO A WESTERN OPTION 3 PROPOSAL, AND TO ACCEPT THE
POINT ON PHASE II ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN THE COURSE OF
THE PHASE I NEGOTIATION.

15. THE EVOLVING FRG POSITION AGAINST REDUCTION AND
LIMITATION OF FRG ARMAMENTS IN PHASE II HAS ALREADY CHANGED
THE BASIS OF THE TWO-PHASE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AS ORIGINALLY
CONCEIVED IN THE WEST. TO SEEK TO GAIN EASTERN ACCEPTANCE
OF THIS CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
JEOPARDIZE THE CHANCES OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. RESOR

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